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I. INTRODUCTION
In August 2000, the District Court for the Central District of California
issued summary judgment against Burmese plaintiffs suing U.S. multinational
Unocal for its pipeline project in Burma. Alleging egregious human rights
violations by Burmese soldiers tasked with providing security for the project,
the fifteen plaintiffs argued that Unocal was both aware of and benefited from
these abuses and thus should be held liable pursuant to the Alien Tort Claim
Act ("ATCA"). While not questioning the plaintiffs' allegations, the court
f LL.M. Candidate, Yale Law School, 2001; B.A. 1992, McGill University; M.A. 1997,
Carleton University; LL.B. 1997, University of Ottawa. My thanks to the editors and staff at The Yale
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concluded in Doe v. Unocal Corp.' that Unocal's connection to human rights
abuses was insufficient to establish liability under the "law of nations," the
litmus test for an ATCA claim.
While the plaintiffs have indicated they will appeal, a the District Court's
reasoning underscores the Achilles heel of claims presently before U.S. courts
of corporate complicity with serious human rights abuses by foreign regimes.
A venerable statute enjoying a modem resuscitation, the Alien Tort Claims
Act provides that "[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any
civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States." 3 While the precise meaning of these
words has sparked controversy, the predominant view at present is that the
ATCA converts a violation of the "law of nations" into a domestic tort
actionable by alien plaintiffs in federal courts.4 This interpretation leads
naturally to expansive federal court subject matter jurisdiction over violations
of international law connected only incidentally to the United States.
However, the "law of nations" is, at times, a remarkably amorphous body of
substantive law from which to derive principles of law applicable in civil
litigation. In most instances in which U.S. companies have been implicated in
human rights abuses, these violations were committed not by the company or
its agents but rather by states. Accordingly, the ATCA seems to oblige
plaintiffs to find in the fuzzy confines of international law a principle of
complicity, negligence or joint and several liability compatible with the
company's limited participation. As international law is almost exclusively
directed at state action, it includes few of the constructs of indirect, private-
party responsibility extant in municipal law. Accordingly, the District Court's
1. 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
2. Evelyn Iritani, Judge Rejects Suit Accusing Unocal of Conspiring with Myanmar, L.A.
TIMs, Sept. 7, 2000, at Cl.
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
4. Notably, the language of "tort" committed in "violation of the laws of nations" raises a
clear question of how a "tort" is to be measured. Are "torts" only actionable under the ATCA where
they exist at international law? Conversely, is the term "tort" intended to convert non-self-executing
violations of international law into domestic civil wrongs cognizable in U.S. courts? In Tel-Oren v.
Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985), the D.C.
Court of Appeals split on this question. Judge Bork, concurring, required the plaintiffs to demonstrate
the existence of "a private right of action to bring this lawsuit either by a specific international legal
right or impliedly by the whole or parts of international law." Id. at 1090. For his part, Judge Edwards,
concurring, did not require "a specific right to sue under the law of nations in order to establish
jurisdiction under section 1350." Id. at 777. More recent decisions follow Judge Edwards's view that
there is no need to identify in international law a procedural right to bring a private action. In Abebe-Jira
v. Negewo, the Eleventh Circuit put it this way: "Congress... has recognized that the Alien Tort Claims
Act confers both a forum and a private right of action to aliens alleging a violation of international law..
. Accordingly, we conclude that the Alien Tort Claims Act establishes a federal forum where courts may
fashion domestic common law remedies to give effect to violations of customary international law." 72
F.3d 844, 847 (1 1th Cir. 1996); see also In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d
1467, 1474-75 (9th Cir. 1994) ("It is unnecessary that international law provide a specific right to sue.");
Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 179 (D.Mass. 1995) ("I find that § 1350 yields both a
jurisdictional grant and a private right to sue for tortious violations of international law (or a treaty of the
United States), without recourse to other law as a source of the cause of action."); Paul v. Avril, 812 F.
Supp. 207, 212 (S.D. Fla. 1993) ("The plain language of the [ATCA] and the use of the words
'committed in violation' strongly implies [sic] that a well pled tort[,] if committed in violation of the law
of nations, would be sufficient [to give rise to a cause of action]."); Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F.
Supp. 2d 424, 443 (D.N.J. 1993) ("[T]his Court finds that the ATCA provides both subject matter
jurisdiction and a private right of action for violations of the law of nations.").
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August 2000 holding in Unocal likely represents the sort of stumbling block
other corporate complicity ATCA claims will encounter as they wend their
way to trial.
The Note that follows explores this contention. First, the Note examines
several case studies involving allegations of complicity by U.S. companies
with foreign states' grave human rights abuses. It then reviews the ATCA
jurisprudence and explores how subject-matter jurisdiction for "complicity"
might be available under the Act. The Note applies lessons drawn from this
analysis to the Unocal case, suggesting a number of weaknesses in the court's
reasoning. It concludes by asserting that, the Unocal decision notwithstanding,
the ATCA remains a potentially serviceable means for calling to account
businesses complicit in human rights abuses.
II. MULTINATIONAL COMPANIES, MILITARIZED COMMERCE,
AND THE ATCA
U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan has insisted that "[t]ransnational
companies have been the first to benefit from globalization. They must take
their share of responsibility for coping with its effects." 5 Yet, despite Mr.
Annan's admonishment, there are now a number of cases in which
multinational companies operating in repressive countries have been
implicated in serious human rights abuses. Most notable are instances in
which companies practice a form of "militarized commerce." For the purposes
of this Note, "militarized commerce" involves reliance by companies on state
military or paramilitary forces for security. 6 Where these units commit
violations of human rights, companies risk being accused of complicity with
their security providers. The section that follows offers several case studies of
"militarized commerce" and points to the potential legal risks companies run
when they engage in such practices.
A. U.S. Oil Companies in Nigeria
Oil companies operating in Nigeria-particularly Royal Dutch Shell and
Chevron-have been subjected to a barrage of criticism over their proximity
to human rights abuses in that country. In a 1999 report of investigations
undertaken in 1997, Human Rights Watch noted "repeated incidents in which
people [were] brutalized for attempting to raise grievances with the
companies." In particular, in some cases security forces "threaten[ed], beat,
and jail[ed] members of community delegations even before they present[ed]
their cases." Such abuses often occurred on or adjacent to company property,
"or in the immediate aftermath of meetings between company officials and
5. Kofi A. Annan, Help the Third World Help Itself, WALL ST. J., Nov. 29, 1999, at A28.
6. For a more extensive account of these practices, see Craig Forcese, Deterring "Militarized
Commerce": The Prospect of Corporate Liability for "Privatized" Human Rights Abuses, 31 OTTAWA
L. REv. 171 (1999-2000).
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individual claimants or community representatives."7 Further, Human Rights
Watch has documented several instances in which oil companies have called
upon the assistance of Nigerian security forces in quelling protests. Some of
these units are infamous for their human fights abuses; in several instances
people were killed by Nigerian troops called to the scene. Companies are said
to have done little or nothing to protest human rights abuses committed by
security forces responding to company requests for assistance.8 For instance,
in February 1999, Human Rights Watch reported that in "one particularly
serious incident on January 4, soldiers using a Chevron helicopter and
Chevron boats attacked villagers in two small communities in Delta State,
Opia and Ikenyan, killing at least four people and burning most of the villages
to the ground." 9
In the wake of these and other instances, both Royal Dutch Shell ° and
Chevron 1 are now being sued in federal court under the ATCA for their
activities in Nigeria. Both cases have survived motions challenging court
jurisdiction over the companies.
The complaint in the lawsuit brought against Chevron alleges that
egregious human rights violations stemming from the events described above
and related occurrences were "inflicted by Nigerian military and police
personnel, who were acting at the behest of, and with the support, cooperation
and financial assistance of ... Chevron., 12 Chevron claims it participated in
the events cited by the plaintiffs only when forced to do so "at gunpoint."
13
The plaintiffs in the case against Shell aver that they "and their next of
kin.., were imprisoned, tortured, and killed by the Nigerian government in
violation of the law of nations at the instigation of the [defendant Shell
companies], in reprisal for their political opposition to the defendants' oil
exploration activities." Further, the Royal Dutch Shell Group "allegedly
provided money, weapons, and logistical support to the Nigerian military,
including the vehicles and ammunition used in the raids on the villages,
procured at least some of these attacks, participated in the fabrication of
murder charges against [some of the plaintiffs' next of kin], and bribed
witnesses to give false testimony against them." 14 Shell denies involvement in
the wrongs detailed in the complaint.
15
7. Human Rights Watch, The Price of Oil: Corporate Responsibility and Human Rights
Violations in Nigeria's Oil Producing Communities (Feb. 23, 1999), at http://www.hnv.org/
hrw/reports/1999/nigeria/index.htm.
8. Id.
9. Press Release, Human Rights Watch, Oil Companies Complicit in Nigerian Abuses (Feb.
23, 1999), at http://www.hrw.org/press/1999/feb/nig0223.htm.
10. Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000).
11. Pl.'s Compl., Bowoto v. Chevron, No. C99-2506 CAL (N.D. Cal. 1999) (on file with the
Yale Journal of International Law); Jason Hoppin, Human Rights Suit Against Chevron to Proceed,
LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, May 18, 2000, at 4; Request to Transfer Suit Against Chevron Denied, S.F.
CHRON., Apr. 8, 2000, at A23.
12. PI.'s Compl., Bowoto v. Chevron, No. C99-2506 CAL, at 3 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
13. Compl. as described in Wiwa, 226 F.3d at 92; Hoppin, supra note 11.
14. Wiwa, 226 F.3d at 93.
15. Letter from Alan Detheridge, Vice President, External Affairs, Exploration & Production,
Shell International, TIMES (London), Nov. 20,2000, at 19.
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B. Freeport McMoRan in Indonesia
The U.S. mining firm Freeport McMoRan runs one of the world's
largest gold mines in Irian Jaya, Indonesia. Local indigenous groups have
opposed the mine since its opening in 1967. Anti-mine protests and violence
have increased since 1977, resulting in crackdowns by the Indonesian
military. 16 In April 1995, the Australian Council for Overseas Aid (ACFOA)
released a report describing significant human rights concerns tied to the
mine. In particular, the report alleged that security services retained by
Freeport, as well as Indonesian military personnel, "engaged in acts of
intimidation, extracted forced confessions, shot 3 civilians, disappeared 5
Dani villagers, and arrested and tortured 13 people . ,"7 ACFOA later
backtracked on its allegations of direct Freeport involvement in killings.
18
Subsequently, an investigation by the Catholic Church reported the murder of
over a dozen civilians by the Indonesian military, including at least four
persons killed by soldiers in Freeport facilities, and multiple instances of
torture. 19 In September 1995, the Indonesian Human Rights Commission
determined that human rights abuses in the mine region "are directly related to
activities of the armed forces and military operations carried out in connection
with efforts to overcome the problem of peace disturbing elements... and in
the framework of safeguarding mining operations of PT Freeport Indonesia
which the government has classified as a vital project. '20 In 1996, Amnesty
International noted with concern that the Indonesian government had failed to
investigate "the role of the mining company, Freeport McMoRan Copper and
Gold Corporation, in the human rights violations.",21 In May 2000, the
Indonesian government announced it "will ask a new human rights
commission to investigate possible [human rights] violations by Freeport-
MCMoRan.
22
Freeport has persistently denied any involvement in human rights
abuses, though it acknowledges that "a few individuals in the Indonesian
military" who have been "tried'and punished under Indonesian law" have
committed human rights abuses.23 Nevertheless, the company has faced
16. Australian Council for Overseas Aid, Eyewitness Accounts of West Papuan Resistance to
the Freeport-McMoRan mine in Irian Jaya, Indonesia and Indonesian Military Repression: June 1994 -
February 1995, at http://wv.moles.org/ProjectUnderground/motherlode/lfreeport/acfoa.html (last
visited Apr. 23, 2001).
17. Id.
18. Robert Bryce, Spinning Gold, MOTHER JONES, Sept.-Oct. 1996, at http://
www.motherjones.comtmotherjones/SO96/bryce.html.
19. Catholic Church of Jayapura, Violations of Human Rights in the Timika Area of Irian Jaya
(1995), at http://wwv.moles.orglProjectUndergroundtmotherlode/freeport/catholic.html (last visited
Apr. 23, 2001).
20. National Human Rights Commission, Results of Monitoring and Investigation of Five
Incidents at Timika and One Incident at Hoea, Irian Jaya, During October 1994 - June 1995 (1995), at
http:/ivv.moles.org/ProjectUnderground/motherlode/freeportlighr.html (last visited Apr. 23, 2001).
21. Amnesty International, Indonesia: Full Justice? Military Trials in Irian Jaya (1996), at
http://www.web.amnesty.orglai.nsf/index/ASA210171996 (last visited Apr. 23, 2001).
22. Freeport Faces Human Rights Probe; N.O.-Based Company Studied by Indonesia, N.
ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, May 26,2000, at Cl.
23. Freeport McMoRan, Issues & Ansivers: Human Rights Allegations, at http://
www.fcx.com/mr/issues&answers/ia-hra.html (last visited Apr. 23, 2001).
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lawsuits in both state24 and federal 25 courts. The federal ATCA claim alleged
the Freeport companies "have systematically engaged in a corporate policy
both directly and indirectly through third parties which have [sic] resulted in
human rights violations against the Amungme Tribe and other Indigenous
tribal people. Said actions include extra-judicial killing, torture, surveillance
and threats of death, severe physical pain and suffering by and through its
security personnel employed in connection with its operation of the Grasberg
mine." 2 6 The Fifth Circuit dismissed the federal ATCA action in 1999 on the
ground that the Indonesian plaintiff had failed to plead sufficient facts
concerning abuses to make out a cause of action.27
The claim in state court 28 alleged, inter alia, personal injury claims
based on the same assertions made in the federal claim. It was dismissed in
March 2000, again apparently because it failed to allege sufficient facts to
make out a cause of action29 and because Freeport could not be held liable for
the actions of its Indonesian subsidiary. 30 The plaintiff reportedly intends to
appeal to the Louisiana Court of Appeals.
31
C. Oil and Gas Companies in Burma
Burma is ruled by a brutal military dictatorship that continues to ignore
the results of a democratic election held in 1990 and has committed persistent
and egregious human rights abuses against its population. Yet, while Burma
has become an international pariah, it continues to benefit from foreign direct
investment.
The most important example of this investment is the Yadana pipeline
initiative, undertaken jointly by oil companies Total and Unocal with the
Burmese and Thai oil parastatals. The pipeline, once in full operation, is
expected to provide Burma's dictatorship "with up to U.S. $400 million per
year, making it the junta's single largest source of liquid funds."32 Further, as
the pipeline lies in a region of civil unrest and armed opposition to the
dictatorship by ethnic groups, the pipeline's presence has fuelled a notable
increase in the presence of security forces providing protection to the
24. Pl.'s Compl., Alomang v. Freeport-McMoRan (June 19, 1996), available at http:l
www.cs.utexas.edu/users/boyer/fplalomang-filing.html.
25. Pl.'s Compl., Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2522 (E.D. La. 1998)
(No. 96-1474), available at http:l/wvw.cs.utexas.edu/userslboyerlfp/filing.html.
26. Id.
27. Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 1999).
28. Alomang v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 97-1349 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/15/98), 718 So. 2d 971
(La. Ct. App. 1998).
29. Press Release, Freeport-McMoRan, State Court Dismisses with Prejudice Complaint
Against Freeport-McMoRan Copper & Gold Inc. (Mar. 23, 2000), at http:llwww.fcx.com/news/
032300.pdf.
30. Stewart Yerton, Indonesian Suit Against Freeport Dismissed, N. ORLEANS TImI-s-
PICAYUNE, Mar. 24,2000, at Cl.
31. Id.
32. EarthRights International & Southeast Asian Information Network, Total Denial: A
Report on the Yadana Pipeline Project in Burma (1996), at http://www.ibiblio.org/freeburmaldocs
totaldenial/td.html (last visited Apr. 23, 2001).
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pipeline. 3 In its 1999 World Report, Human Rights Watch noted that "the
Burmese forces providing security for the project [reportedly] continued to
commit violations against villagers along the pipeline route, including
killings, torture, rape, displacement of entire villages, and forced labor.
34
Meanwhile, the pleadings made in a lawsuit against Unocal brought in the
United States allege that "[i]n the course of its actions on behalf of the joint
venture,... [the regime] carried out a program of violence and intimidation
against area villagers .... On information and belief, plaintiffs allege women
and girls in the... region have been targets of rape and other sexual abuse by
[regime] officials, both when left behind after male family members have
been taken away to perform forced labor and when they themselves have been
subjected to forced labor."35
Unocal and Total have repeatedly denied that human rights abuses have
occurred in relation to the pipeline. 36 The lawsuit brought against these
companies is discussed in greater detail in Part IV.
D. Discussion
The case studies cited above reflect a considerable literature discussing
the role of resource companies in fuelling or contributing to conflict and
human rights abuses in various countries.37 These case studies show, first, that
militarized commerce in the form of company reliance on state militaries is
practiced by resource companies operating in the developing world and,
second, that security forces affiliated with companies at some level have been
implicated in serious human rights abuses. Put another way, and assuming
their veracity, the case studies suggest that "militarized commerce" may
involve some level of corporate complicity with state human rights abuses.
Black's Law Dictionary defines "complicity" as an "association or
participation in a criminal act." 38 Clearly, such acts create victims, many of
33. Id.
34. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 1999, at http:l/www.hrw.orglhrw/
worldreport99/speciallcorporations.html (last visited Apr. 23, 2001).
35. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 885 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
36. See, e.g., Unocal, Human Rights and Economic Engagement, at http://wwv.unocal.coml
responsibility/humanrights/hr5.htm (last visited Apr. 23, 2001).
37. E.g., Situation of Human Rights in the Sudan, U.N. Sec. Gen., 54th Sess., Agenda Item
116(c), U.N. Doc. A/54/467 (1999); Peter Verney, Raising the Stakes: Oil and Conflict in the Sudan
(1999) (report on file with the author); Steven Edwards et al., Calgary Firm Tied to Sudan 'Atrocities',
NAT'L POST, Nov. 17, 1999, at Al; News Release, Amnesty International, Sudan: The Human Price of
Oil (Mar. 5, 2000), at http:/lwww.web.amnesty.orglai.nsf/index/AFR540042000; News Release,
Amnesty International, Colombia: British Petroleum Risks Fuelling Human Rights Crisis Through
Military Training (June 30, 1997), at http:lwvw.amnesty.it/newsll997/22304497.htmn; John Harker,
Human Security in Sudan: The Report of a Canadian Assessment, prepared for the Minister of Foreign
Affairs (Canada), Jan. 2000, at http:llwwv.dfait-maeci.gc.calforeignp/3110186-e.pdf; Human Rights
Watch, The Enron Corporation: Corporate Complicity in Human Rights Violations (1999), at http://
www.hrw.orglhnv/reportsl1999/enron; Human Rights Watch, Colombia: Human Rights Concerns
Raised by the Security Arrangements of Transnational Oil (1998), at http:lvww.hrv.orgladvocacy/
corporationslcolombia/Oilpat.htm; Scott Pegg, Corporate Armies for States and State Armies for
Corporations: Addressing the Challenges of Globalization and Natural Resource Conflict, Paper
prepared for delivery at the 2000 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Aug.
31 - Sept. 3,2000, at http:l/pro.harvard.edulabstracts19/O19OlOPeggScottO.htm; Forcese, supra note 6.
38. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 279 (7th ed. 1999)
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whom will likely desire redress. Yet, in many instances, the principal actor
actually committing human rights abuses will be a sovereign government, able
to render itself virtually judgment-proof by creating court systems unwilling
or incapable of adjudicating claims for compensation or punishing
transgressions of criminal law by powerful actors. In Burma, for example,
through 1998, "the Government continued to rule by decree and was not
bound by any constitutional provisions providing for fair public trials or any
other rights. Although remnants of the British-era legal system were formally
in place, the court system and its operation remained seriously flawed,
particularly in the handling of political cases. 39 In Indonesia, "[t]here were
few signs of judicial independence. The court continued to be used to take
action against, or deny legal remedy to, political activists and government
critics."4 In Nigeria, "[s]ome courts are understaffed. Judges frequently fail to
show up for trials, often because they are pursuing other means of income. In
addition court officials often lack the proper equipment, training, and
motivation for the performance of their duties, again due in no small part to
inadequate compensation. 41
Accordingly, victims seeking redress are left either to the often-
indifferent mercies of the international legal system or are faced with the
prospect of seeking compensation via the court systems of another state. The
latter approach is fraught with its own difficulties, not the least of which are
principles of personal jurisdiction and other jurisdiction-limiting doctrines
such as sovereign immunity. Where multinational corporations operating in
the United States are potential defendants, however, these jurisdictional
hurdles are less pressing. Plainly, corporations are not "subjects" of
international law and are generally viewed as falling outside the confines of
international human rights instruments.42 However, by properly identifying
the appropriate venue, foreigh plaintiffs are in an excellent position to urge
U.S. courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over companies domiciled within
their districts. In establishing subject-matter jurisdiction for their international
law claims, the most notable tool used by plaintiffs to date has been the Alien
Tort Claims Act.
III. THE ATCA AND CORPORATE COMPLICITY WITH
HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES
As noted above, the ATCA provides that "[t]he district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed
in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States."43 The law
39. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BURMA COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1998,
815 (1999).
40. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, INDONESIA COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR
1998, 915 (1999).
41. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, NIGERIA COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR
1998, 322 (1999).
42. See Saman Zia-Zarifi, Suing Multinational Corporations in the U.S. for Violating
International Law, 4 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 81 (1999).
43. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
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dates from 1789,44 but its origins are obscure. In Eastman Kodak Co. v.
Kavlin, the District Court for the Southern District of Florida observed that
"[t]his statute presumably is based upon Congress' power under Article I,
section 8 to 'define and punish... offenses against the Law of Nations."'
45
Yet, "although the constitutional text permits Congress to 'define and punish,'
the ATCA punishes, but does not define." 46 The court noted that this lack of
clear definition "raises some interpretative challenges for courts entertaining
ATCA suits. 'The law of nations' means many things to many people. 'A7 As
the section that follows suggests, courts applying the ATCA have struggled
with this problem.
A. International Law and the ATCA
For most courts, the substantive law to be applied in an ATCA lawsuit is
international law.48 As Justice Cardozo once observed, "[i]nternational law, or
the law that governs between states has at times, like the common law within
states, a twilight existence during which it is hardly distinguishable from
morality or justice, till at length the imprimatur of a court attests [to] its jural
quality. 49 In grappling with international law's ambiguity and determining
when an international norm is deserving of judicial imprimatur, federal courts
have established a fairly consistent test. In its venerable decision in United
States v. Smith,50 the Supreme Court concluded the law of nations "may be
ascertained by consulting the works of jurists, writing professedly on public
law; or by the general usage and practice of nations; or by judicial decisions
recognising and enforcing that law." Similarly, in Hilton v. Guyot,51 the Court
concluded that where "there is no written [international] law upon the subject.
. t]he courts must obtain such aid as they can from judicial decisions, from
the works of jurists and commentators, and from the acts and usages of
civilized nations."
Cases deciding ATCA matters have relied on this jurisprudence. In both
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala52 and Kadic v. Karadzic,53 the Second Circuit held that
44. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9(b), 1 Stat. 77 (1789).
45. 978 F. Supp. 1078 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
46. Id. at 1090.
47. Id.
48. For arguments suggesting that U.S. tort law might form the substantive cause of action for
an ATCA claim triggered by international law violations, see Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726
F.2d 774, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985). In Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum
Co., citing Tel-Oren and other cases, the Second Circuit implied that the issue of what substantive law a
court will apply in an ATCA claim is not completely closed. 226 F.3d 88, 105 n.12 (2d Cir. 2000).
49. New Jersey v. Delaware, 291 U.S. 361, 383 (1934).
50. 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160-61 (1820).
51. 159 U.S. 113, 163 (1895); see also The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900)
("[Wlhere there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort
must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations; and, as evidence of these, to the works of
jurists and commentators, who by years of labor, research and experience, have made themselves
peculiarly well acquainted with the subjects of which they treat. Such works are resorted to by judicial
tribunals, not for the speculations of their authors concerning what the law ought to be, but for
trustworthy evidence of what the law really is.").
52. 630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980) (quoting Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 160-61).
53. 70 F.3d 232, 238 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880), cert. denied, 518 U.S.
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international law is to be assessed with reference to the writings of jurists, the
practice of nations, and previous judicial decisions. Where this inquiry
establishes that the defendant's alleged conduct violates "'well-established,
universally recognized norms of international law,' . . . as opposed to
'idiosyncratic legal rules,' ... then federal jurisdiction exists under the Alien
Tort Act." 54 Yet, as the following section suggests, while the test for
substantive law under the ATCA is easily stated, its application and inherent
limitations where questions of individual-rather than state-liability arise
can create real complexities.
B. Individual Responsibility and the Law of Nations
Recently, several courts have been asked to determine whether the "law
of nations" extends beyond the conduct of states to govern actions by private
individuals. Answering this question in the affirmative, courts have found
individual liability for international wrongs in two circumstances. First, courts
canvassing international law have identified several acts that constitute
international crimes for which individual liability exists at international law.
In Kadic, the Second Circuit wrote: "We do not agree that the law of nations,
as understood in the modem era, confines its reach to state action. Instead, we
hold that certain forms of conduct violate the law of nations whether
undertaken by those acting under the auspices of a state or only as private
individuals." 5 For the Second Circuit, determining whether the wrongs
alleged were of the sort that created liability for individuals requires the court
to "make a particularized examination of these offenses, mindful of the
important precept that 'evolving standards of international law govern who is
within the [Alien Tort Act's] jurisdictional grant.' 56 To date, courts in ATCA
cases have either found or discussed individual responsibility with respect to
piracy,57 the slave trade,58 slavery and forced labor,
59 aircraft hijacking,60
genocide, 61 war crimes,62 and other "offenses of 'universal concern."' 63
1005 (1996); see also In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th
Cir. 1994) ("Actionable violations of international law must be of a norm that is specific, universal, and
obligatory."), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1126 (1995); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1540 (N.D.
Cal. 1987) ("These international torts, violations of current customary international law, are
characterized by universal consensus in the international community as to their binding status and their
content. That is, they are universal, definable, and obligatory international norms.'), amended in part,
694 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
54. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 239 (citing Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881, 888).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 241 (citing Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 830 F.2d 421, 425
(2d Cir. 1987)).
57. Id. at 239; Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 794-95 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(Edwards, J., concurring), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985).
58. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 239; see also Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 444
(D.N.J. 1993) (suggesting, without deciding, that "private entities using slave labor are liable under the
law of nations").
59. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 891-92 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
60. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 240 (2d Cir. 1995).
61. Id. at 242; see also Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362, 371 (E.D. La.
1997), aff'd 197 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing Kadic and approving of the claim that certain crimes,
such as genocide, incur individual responsibility).
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Second, courts have concluded that certain forms of indirect
participation in state-committed wrongs may render an individual liable,
irrespective of whether individual liability is available at international law. In
several instances, the courts have suggested that individual liability may arise
from conspiracy or conspiracy-like participation with state actors committing
violations of the laws of nations. In Carmichael v. United Technologies
Corp., the plaintiff was imprisoned and tortured while on business in Saudi
Arabia, in the wake of a contract dispute with some of the defendant
companies. 65 The plaintiff s release had been made conditional on payment of
all claims made against him by the defendant firms. Upon obtaining his
release, the plaintiff brought suit in the Southern District of Texas, invoking
the ATCA and alleging that the defendant companies conspired with the Saudi
government to have him jailed. The claims against most defendants named in
the suit were dismissed by reason of improper service, and this determination
was upheld by the Court of Appeals. While the Court of Appeals was not
persuaded that the facts supported plaintiffs allegations against the remaining
defendant company, it was prepared to assume-though it found it
unnecessary to decide-that "the Alien Tort Statute does confer subject matter
jurisdiction over private parties who conspire in, or aid and abet, official acts
of torture by one nation against the citizens of another nation."
66
Similarly, in Eastman Kodak, plaintiffs in a contractual dispute with a
Bolivian company alleged a conspiracy on the part of the firm and the
Bolivian authorities to imprison the individual plaintiff under horrendous
conditions. For the District Court a key question in determining whether the
Bolivian corporation could be held liable under the ATCA was "whether the
ATCA makes a private actor liable in tort for conspiring with state actors to
violate the law of nations, ''67 in this case arbitrary and inhumane detention.
The court observed that "it would be a strange tort system that imposed
liability on state actors but not on those who conspired with them to perpetrate
illegal acts through the coercive use of state power., 68 Analogizing to federal
constitutional precedents establishing that "those who conspire with state
actors to invade the constitutional rights of others may be held liable along
with the state actors," 69 the court held that a conspiracy between private
individuals and state actors to commit a violation of the law of nations was
actionable under the ATCA.
70
Notably, neither the Fifth Circuit in Carmichael nor the District Court in
Eastman Kodak asked whether the law of nations itself contemplated
conspiracy or aiding and abetting as wrongs for which individuals might be
62. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 243; see also Doe v. Islamic Salvation Front, 993 F. Supp. 3, 8 (D.D.C.
1998) (applying ATCA to non-state entity).
63. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 240.
64. E.g., Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 776 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that a foreign
leader can be liable where he "directed, ordered, conspired with, or aided the military in torture,
summary execution, and 'disappearance').
65. 835 F.2d 109 (5th Cir. 1988).
66. Id. at 113-14.
67. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Kavlin, 978 F. Supp. 1078, 1091 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
68. Id.
69. Id. (citing Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24,27-28 (1980)).
70. Id. at 1094.
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liable. In other words, it was irrelevant whether there was an international
crime of "aiding and abetting" or "conspiracy" to "commit arbitrary and
inhumane detention." It was equally irrelevant whether such crimes extended
international liability to individuals. In both cases, the concept of "conspiracy"
or "aiding and abetting" seemed to reflect domestic law concepts. The courts'
approach impliedly fuses U.S. concepts of complicitous guilt onto breaches of
the law of nations, thereby side-stepping painstaking efforts to determine the
scope of this concept in international law and potentially simplifying the
ATCA's application.
The Carmichael and Eastman Kodak courts are not alone in relying on
domestic legal doctrine to flesh out ATCA claims. Given the cases it relies
upon, Eastman Kodak is likely a variant of a now notable line of jurisprudence
grafting concepts of state action in federal constitutional doctrine onto the
ATCA and thereby circumventing the principle that only states, and not
private individuals, are capable of violations of international law. In Kadic,
the Second Circuit held that "[t]he 'color of law' jurisprudence of 42 U.S.C. §
1983 [civil action for deprivation of rights] is a relevant guide to whether a
defendant has engaged in official action for purposes of jurisdiction under the
Alien Tort Act."7 'Color of law,' for the Kadic court, is a construct extending
state liability to an individual where that person "acts together with state
officials or with significant state aid."72 Much of the color of law
jurisprudence involves wrongful acts by private parties, determined to be state
actors for the purposes of constitutional torts. In the ATCA context, courts are
evidently very comfortable reversing this scenario, relying on state action
doctrine to link wrongful action by states to private parties somehow
connected to the violation.
Color of law or state action approaches 73 have now been applied in
several cases in which companies have been accused of acting as de facto
state actors in breaches of international law. In a 1997 proceeding in Doe v.
Unocal Corp.,74 the District Court for the Central District of California
reviewed color of law jurisprudence in U.S. constitutional practice, noting that
"where there is a 'substantial degree of cooperative action' between the state
and private actors in effecting the deprivation of rights, state action is
present." On the facts in that case, allegations "that the private plaintiffs were
and are jointly engaged with the state officials in the challenged activity,
namely forced labor and other human rights violations in furtherance of the
pipeline project .. . [were] sufficient to support subject-matter jurisdiction
71. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 245 (2d Cir. 1995).
72. Id. (citing Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982)).
73. Color of law and state action are used synonymously by the courts. See United States v.
Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n.7 (1966) ("In cases under § 1983, 'under color' of law has consistently been
treated as the same thing as the 'state action' required under the Fourteenth Amendment."); see also
Lugar, 457 U.S. at 929 ("[It is clear that in a § 1983 action brought against a state official, the statutory
requirement of action 'under color of state law' and the 'state action' requirement of the Fourteenth
Amendment are identical."). But see Collins v. Womancare, 878 F.2d 1145, 1148 (9th Cir. 1989)
(interpreting the Supreme Court as maintaining a distinction between the two concepts), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 1056 (1990).
74. 963 F. Supp. 880, 890-91 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (citing Gallagher v. "Neil Young Freedom
Concert," 49 F.3d 1442, 1453 (10th Cir. 1995)).
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under the ATCA. ''75 In Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., the district court, while
not invoking § 1983 by name, concluded that the defendant company:
acted in close cooperation with Nazi officials in compelling civilians to perform forced
labor.... The allegation that Ford Werke pursued its own economic interests, or that its
own employees (as opposed to Nazi officials), mistreated Iwanowa, does not preclude a
determination that Ford Werke acted as an agent of, or in concert with, the German Reich
.... Consequently, even if this Court were to find that no liability attaches to private
actors for violations of international law, by showing that (1) she is an alien (2) suing for
a tort (forced labor/slave trade) (3) committed by a defacto state actor (4) in violation of
the law of nations, Iwanowa has established subject matter jurisdiction under the
ATCA.76
The exact level of connection required for a company to become a state
actor under the color of law approach to ATCA has not been precisely
demarcated. There are clearly some levels of participation that fall below the
level of engagement necessary to constitute state action. In Ge v. Peng,77 the
District Court for the District of Columbia declined to find state action where
the only relationship between a company and a state factory committing
human rights abuses was the company's imprint on the factory's product.
Invoking the test established by Unocal via analogy to § 1983, the court
concluded: "[I]t is clear that plaintiffs here have not alleged the 'substantial
degree of cooperative action' between the Chinese government defendants
and Adidas such that jurisdiction would be proper under a state action
theory.",
78
C. Actionable Complicity Under the ATCA
On the basis of the discussion in the previous section, it is evident that,
under present interpretations of the ATCA, complicity with a violation of
international law is potentially actionable in two circumstances: 1) where
international law itself contains a doctrine rendering individuals liable for
complicity with violations of the law of nations, 79 and 2) where the color of
law analysis in domestic constitutional jurisprudence stretches far enough to
capture acts of complicity. While the Carmichael decision suggests a third
approach-one relying on domestic criminal law concepts of conspiracy and
aiding and abetting-it does not decide the issue. Accordingly, this Note will
confine itself to exploring international law and color of law considerations
and their implications for complicity with human rights abuses.
75. Unocal, 963 F. Supp. at 891.
76. Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 446 (D.N.J. 1993).
77. Civ. No. 98-1986 (TFH), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12711 (D.D.C. Aug. 28,2000).
78. Id. at 16.
79. As is suggested by the discussion above, in practice this approach converts international
criminal law into a civil tort. It may be that the conversion of substantive sources of international
criminal liability into civil wrongs raises procedural questions; for example, what standard of proof
should be used in such an instance? On the other hand, the authorities discussed previously, supra note
4, imply that the ATCA imports substantive principles of international as domestic torts, without any
regard being paid to the procedural apparatus that may surround those principles in international law.
Put another way, ATCA supplies the procedure, international law defines the nature of the wrong.
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1. Complicity for Violations of International Law as an International
Wrong
It is clear from the writings of jurists and the decisions of international
war crimes tribunals that a concept of complicitous guilt does exist in
international law. In its recent decision in Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, s° the
Appeals Chamber of the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) had occasion to review these authorities. In this regard, the Chamber
noted, "[m]any post-World War II cases concerning war crimes proceed upon
the principle that when two or more persons act together to further a common
criminal purpose, offences perpetrated by any of them may entail the criminal
liability of all the members of the group.""1
For the Chamber, "[c]lose scrutiny of the relevant case law shows that
broadly speaking, the notion of common purpose encompasses three distinct
categories of collective criminality. 's First, there are instances where "all co-
defendants, acting pursuant to a common design, possess the same criminal
intention." 83 The Chamber points to instances where co-perpetrators form a
common plan to kill in which each has a different role, but all posses the
intent to kill. Here, the key consideration is a shared mens rea to commit the
crime, coupled with some participation in the completion of the common
enterprise.
Second, the Chamber noted the so-called "concentration camp" cases.8 4
In these trials, "[t]he notion of common purpose was applied to instances
where the offences charged were alleged to have been committed by members
of military or administrative units such as those running concentration
camps."8 5 Summarizing the outcome of these cases, the Chamber determined
that the actus reus in these cases "was the active participation in the
enforcement of a system of repression," while the mens rea element
"comprised: (i) knowledge of the nature of the system and (ii) the intent to
further the common concerted design to ill-treat inmates." 86
80. Judgment of the Appeals Chamber, IT-94-1-A (ICTY, July 15, 1999), at http:Il
www.un.org/icty/tadic/appeal/judgementlindex_2.htm.
81. Id., para. 195.
82. Id.
83. Id., paras. 196-98. The Chamber cited various post-World War II war crimes trials in the
discussion of common criminal purpose. E.g., Trial of Otto Sandrock and three others, British Military
Court for the Trial of War Criminals, held at the Court House, Almelo, Holland, on 24-26 Nov., 1945,
UNWCC, vol. I, p. 35, cited in id., para. 197 n.233; Hoelzer et al., Canadian Military Court, Aurich,
Germany, Record of Proceedings, 25 Mar.-6 Apr. 1946, vol. I, pp. 341, 347, 349 (RCAF Binder 181.009
(D2474), cited in id. n.235; Trial of Gustav Alfred Jepsen and others, Proceedings of a War Crimes Trial
held at Luneberg, Germany, on 13-23 Aug., 1946, Judgment of 24 Aug. 1946, cited in id., para. 19S
n.236.
84. Tadic, IT-94-I-A, para. 202 n.248 (citing Trial of Martin Gottfried Weiss and thirty-nine
others, General Military Government Court of the United States Zone, Dachau, Germany, 15 Nov.-13
Dec., 1945, UNWCC, vol. XI, p. 5); id. n.249 (citing Trial of Josef Kramer and 44 others, British
Military Court, Luneberg, 17 Sept.-17 Nov., 1945, UNWCC, vol. II, p. 1).
85. Id., para. 202 n.248 (citing Trial of Martin Gottfried Weiss, p. 5).
86. Tadic, IT-94-1-A, para. 203.
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Finally, "[t]he third category concerns cases involving a common design
to pursue one course of conduct where one of the perpetrators commits an act
which, while outside the common design, was nevertheless a natural and
foreseeable consequence of the effecting of that common purpose."8 7 The
Chamber explored this concept using a hypothetical: If a group of individuals
were to embark on a common enterprise of 'ethnically cleansing' a village
and, during the course of that activity, victims were shot, "[c]riminal
responsibility may be imputed to all participants within the common
enterprise where the risk of death occurring was both a predictable
consequence of the execution of the common design and the accused was
either reckless or indifferent to that risk.""8 Citing a series of post-World War
II cases,89 the Chamber determined that mens rea in this scenario required:
"(i) the intention to take part in a joint criminal enterprise and to further-
individually and jointly-the criminal purposes of that enterprise; and (ii) the
foreseeability of the possible commission by other members of the group of
offences that do not constitute the object of the common criminal purpose." 
90
Foreseeability, in this context, means more than a negligence standard.
Instead, "[w]hat is required is a state of mind in which a person, although he
did not intend to bring about a certain result, was aware that the actions of the
group were most likely to lead to that result but nevertheless willingly took
that risk." 91
2. Color of Law/State Action
As noted in Section 11I.B, U.S. courts have not hesitated to import §
1983 color of law jurisprudence into the ATCA. Notably, neither the
influential Second Circuit Kadic judgment, nor the Forti decision that it cites
to justify its position,92 provide an analysis of how § 1983 principles might be
tempered in their application to ATCA cases. Consequently, as the discussion
of Unocal in Part IV will illustrate, the courts have often applied § 1983
principles in an ad hoc manner. This Section explores how § 1983 might
inform ATCA cases. It also suggests, however, that there is a body of
international law providing an equally robust body of principles. Given that
the ATCA supposedly incorporates as a tort substantive international law, this
87. Id., para. 204.
88. Id.
89. E.g., Trial of Erich Heyer and six others (Essen Lynching Case), British Military Court for
the Trial of War Criminals, Essen, 18-19 & 21-22 Dec., 1945, UNWCC, vol. I, p. 88, at p.9 1, cited in
Tadic, IT-94-I-A, para. 207 n.255; Kurt Goebell et al. (Borkum Island case), Charge Sheet, U.S.
National Archives Microfilm Publications I, cited in Tadic, IT-94-I-A, para. 210 n.261.
90. Tadic, IT-94-I-A, para. 220.
91. Id.
92. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 245 (2d Cir. 1995) ("The 'color of law' jurisprudence of
42 U.S.C. § 1983 is a relevant guide to whether a defendant has engaged in official action for purposes
ofjurisdiction under the Alien Tort Act [citing Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1546 (N.D.
Cal. 1987)]."). Forti dealt with a lawsuit by Argentine victims of a former Argentine general. On the §
1983 issue, Forti merely indicates that "[c]laims for tortious conduct of government officials under 28
U.S.C. § 1350 may be analogized to domestic lawsuits brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, where plaintiffs
must allege both deprivation of a federally protected right and action 'under color of' state law." 672 F.
Supp. at 1546.
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international doctrine may provide a more logical source of law in ATCA
cases than does § 1983.
a. Domestic § 1983 Jurisprudence
Determining when state and private involvement in a wrongful activity
are so conflated that each actor is properly considered a state actor under §
1983 is a key concern of both U.S. constitutional law and ATCA
jurisprudence. Yet, as the Supreme Court observed in Lebron v. National R.R.
Passenger Corp., "our cases deciding when private action might be deemed
that of the state have not been a model of consistency." 9 Courts have
identified several different tests applied by the Supreme Court.94 The Supreme
Court itself has categorized state action into four classes.95 First, state action
exists where a private party partakes in a public function 96 or enjoys "powers
traditionally exclusively reserved to the State." 97 Second, the Court has
discerned state action where state compulsion obliges the private party to
commit the wrongful act.98 Third, in some instances, the nexus between the
state and the actions of a private entity is such that the "the action of the latter
may be fairly treated as that of the State itself."99 Last, the Court has invoked
a "joint action" test. In Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., the Court implied that
this test might be restricted to cases involving "prejudgment attachments." 100
However, as the discussion below suggests, other cases have expanded the
joint action test significantly.
The distinctions among these approaches are not always clear. The
Supreme Court itself has mused that the different approaches may simply be
"different ways of characterizing the necessarily fact-bound inquiry that
confronts the Court." 10 1 With that caveat in mind, two of these approaches-
the nexus and joint action tests-merit further consideration.
93. 513 U.S. 374, 378 (1995) (citing Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 632
(1991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)).
94. Compare, for example, the classification offered in Gallagher v. "Neil Young Freedom
Concert," 49 F.3d 1442, 1448-51 (10th Cir. 1995), with that set out in Sandoval v. Bluegrass Regional
Mental Health-Mental Retardation Bd., No. 99-5018, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 17949 (6th Cir., July 11,
2000).
95. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982).
96. Id. (citing Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501
(1946)).
97. Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974) (holding no state action existed in
a case involving actions by a privately owned and operated utility corporation).
98. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 170 (1970) (holding that state action might
exist where discriminatory actions by restaurant reflected state-enforced custom).
99. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 351.
100. 457 U.S. at 937 (holding that state action may arise where a corporate creditor acts jointly
with state in attaching plaintiffs property without due process).
101. Id. at 939. Some courts have sliced up the Supreme Court's state action jurisprudence
differently. See, e.g., Gallagher v. "Neil Young Freedom Concert," 49 F.3d 1442, 1447 (10th Cir. 1995)
(distinguishing between a "nexus" test and a "symbiotic relationship" test).
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(i) Nexus/Symbiotic Relationship Approach
In Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, Justice Marshall observed that "[t]he
decisions of this Court clearly establish that where there is a symbiotic
relationship between the State and a privately owned enterprise, so that the
State and a privately owned enterprise are participants in a joint venture, the
actions of the private enterprise may be attributable to the State." 102 While
Justice Marshall was in dissent, his observation reflects a long, if somewhat
more nuanced, line of reasoning that appears in other federal cases. The
leading case is Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority.l03 In Burton, a
private restaurant refused to serve the plaintiff on racial grounds. The
restaurant, while clearly a private business, leased space in a building
constructed with public monies for public purposes and owned and operated
by a state agency. The unique relationship of the restaurant with the publicly-
run parking facility produced a number of mutual benefits. Guests to the
restaurant had a convenient place to park while the presence of the restaurant
likely increased the demand for public parking. As the Court added, "[n]either
[could] it be ignored, especially in view of [the restaurant's] affirmative
allegation that for it to serve Negroes would injure its business, that profits
earned by discrimination not only contribute[d] to, but also [welre
indispensable elements in, the financial success of a governmental agency.'"
For the Court, the public nature of the construction and operation of the
facility as a whole, the physical placement of the restaurant in a public
facility, and the mutual benefits accruing to the restaurant and the state from
this placement together demonstrated a degree of state participation sufficient
to constitute state action.
05
Currently, the breadth of the Burton nexus or symbiotic relationship
doctrine is uncertain. In several instances, the Supreme Court has sought to
limit its scope.1°6 Simple regulation 1°7 or public financing 1°s are now
insufficient to convert a private actor into a state functionary. The Court has
also concluded that mere state "approval of or acquiescence in the initiatives
of a private party is not sufficient to justify holding the State responsible for
those initiatives."'1 9 Finally, in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., the Court
commented on Burton and urged that "while 'a multitude of relationships
might appear to some to fall within the [Fourteenth] Amendment's embrace,'
102. 457 U.S. 830, 847 (1982) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
103. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
104. Id. at 724.
105. Id.
106. See, e.g., Murphy v. New York Racing Ass'n, 76 F. Supp. 2d 489, 495 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)
(citing leading commentator for proposition that '".although Burton has never been overruled, it has been
narrowed to the point of being virtually unworkable as a state action doctrine"); see also Gallagher, 49
F.3d at 1451 (noting that later Supreme Court decisions have read Burton narrowly).
107. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1011 (1982); see also American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40,57 (1999).
108. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842 (1982).
109. Blun, 457 U.S. at 1004-05; see also San Francisco Arts & Athletics v. U.S. Olympic
Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 547 (1987).
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differences in circumstances beget differences in law, limiting the actual
holding to lessees of public property." 
110
Some circuit courts have not heeded the Court's seemingly emphatic
advice in Jackson.111 Yet the high threshold established by the Supreme Court
through its caveats to Burton has generally rendered lower courts reluctant to
find a nexus between state and private action, even in public property matters.
Some courts, reviewing the nexus case law, have concluded that where the
approach is adopted, the most important consideration in the potpourri of
connecting variables is evidence that each party benefits from the wrongful
act itself, and not just from the parties' broader relationship.1 12
(ii) Joint Action Approach
According to the Tenth Circuit in Gallagher v. "Neil Young Freedom
Concert, " 113 in determining whether a private party is a willing participant in
joint action with a state, "courts examine whether state officials and private
parties have acted in concert in effecting a particular deprivation of
constitutional rights."'1 4 While the relevant case law is perplexing in its
variability, there appear to be two lines of joint action jurisprudence. First, in
some cases, courts have found joint action where the private actor and the
state conspire to violate constitutional rights. The Supreme Court has held that
"an otherwise private person acts 'under color of state law when engaged in a
conspiracy with state officials to deprive another of federal rights."
115
Conspiracy in this context seems to mean a meeting of minds concerning an
unlawful objective. As the Seventh Circuit put it in Cunningham v. Seattle
Center for Mental Health, Inc., "[a] requirement of the joint action charge
therefore is that both public and private actors share a common,
unconstitutional goal." 
116
Second, as Gallagher observed, "[o]ther courts applying the joint action
test have focused on the manner in which the alleged constitutional
deprivation is effected. These decisions hold that, if there is a 'substantial
110. 419 U.S. 345,358 (1974) (quoting Burton, 365 U.S. at 726).
111. Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1143 n.6 (3d Cir. 1995) (urging that the
Burton test, in spite of Jackson, "remains a viable framework for assessing state actor status"), cert.
denied 516 U.S. 858 (1995). But see Haavistola v. Community Fire Co., 6 F.3d 211 (4th Cir. 1993)
(relying on Jackson to constrict Burton).
112. Murphy v. New York Racing Ass'n, 76 F. Supp. 2d 489, 495 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (citing
leading commentator for proposition that the lower federal courts "'usually reject state action claims
based on the Burton symbiotic relationship doctrine... generally following the present Supreme Court's
reading of Burton that the most significant fact that led to the finding of state action was the public
authority's profiting from the [private actor's) discrimination').
113. 49 F.3d 1442 (1995).
114. Id. at 1453 (citing Collins v. Womancare, 878 F.2d 1145, 1154 (9th Cir. 1989); Sims v.
Jefferson Downs Racing Ass'n, 778 F.2d 1068, 1076-80 (5th Cir. 1985)).
115. Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 920 (1984).
116. 924 F.2d 106, 107 (7th Cir. 1991); see also Moore v. Marketplace Rest., Inc., 754 F.2d
1336, 1352 (7th Cir. 1985) ("In order to establish a conspiracy, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the
state officials and the private party somehow reached'an understanding to deny the plaintiffs their
constitutional rights."); Johnson v. B. H. Liquidation Corp., No. 93-151412, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS
2975, at *3 (9th Cir. Feb. 7, 1994) ("In order to prove such a conspiracy under section 1983, however,
an agreement to violate constitutional rights must be shown.").
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degree of cooperative action' between state and private officials, . . .or if
there is 'overt and significant state participation' . . . in carrying out the
deprivation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights, state action is present."" 7
This second approach to which Gallagher alludes appears consistent with
several Supreme Court cases finding joint action where the harm is caused by
state actors responding to a legal procedure commenced by a private party.
118
In these cases, "a private party's mere use of the State's dispute resolution
machinery" does not constitute state action "without the 'overt, significant
assistance of state officials."" 19 As with the nexus test, the courts have also
consistently held that "the mere acquiescence of a state official in the actions
of a private party is not sufficient."120 In Gallagher,'2' the defendant promoter
leased facilities from a state university for a concert for a substantial fee. In
preparing for the concert, the promoter followed university protocol and,
partially to fulfill university requirements, it retained the defendant company
to provide crowd management during the event. The defendant company had
an explicit "pat-down" policy for searching attendees at rock concerts.
University officials were present at discussions regarding the reliance on "pat-
down" searches. Subsequently, defendant company personnel searched
concert patrons, while University police looked on. The Tenth Circuit found
no joint action where state university police officers simply observed the pat-
down searches completed by the defendant company's personnel and played
no role in influencing the searches.
(iii) Proximate Cause
Compounding uncertainty concerning the precise scope of state action is
the doctrine of "proximate cause" invoked by several circuit courts-
particularly in the Ninth Circuit-as a key component of § 1983 proceedings.
As the Ninth Circuit put it in Van Ort v. Estate of Stanewich, "although state
action and causation are separate concepts, . . . elements of the causation
analysis have been used in determining state action."'122 The proximate cause
analysis is particularly important where the wrong is committed by state
agents but prompted at some level by private parties. The leading case is
Arnold v. IBM.123 Here, IBM was part of a task force with state officials
investigating leaks of trade secrets. As a result of the task force's activities,
the plaintiff was arrested and indicted and had his house searched. The case
against the plaintiff was later dropped. He then sued IBM for its involvement
in the harm he suffered, relying on § 1983. In deciding against the plaintiff,
117. Gallagher v. "Neil Young Freedom Concert," 49 F.3d 1442, 1454 (10th Cir. 1995).
118. Tulsa ProflI Collection Servs., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 486 (1988) (reasoning that
"when private parties make use of state procedures with the overt, significant assistance of state
officials, state action may be found"); see also Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
119. American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 54 (1999).
120. Gallagher, 49 F.3d at 1453 ("This Court . .. has never held that a State's mere
acquiescence in a private action converts that action into that of the State.") (citing Flagg Bros., Inc. v.
Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 164 (1978)).
121. Id. at 1442.
122. 92 F.3d 831, 836 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied 519 U.S. 1111 (1997).
123. 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981).
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the Ninth Circuit held that "liability under section 1983 can be established by
showing that the defendant personally participated in a deprivation of the
plaintiffs rights, or caused such a deprivation to occur .... The causation
requirement of sections 1983 ... is not satisfied by a showing of mere
causation in fact. Rather, the plaintiff must establish proximate or legal
causation. ' 124 In describing this concept, the court invoked the requirement of
foreseeability. However, in applying the proximate cause test to the facts, the
court also examined whether IBM had "some control or power" over the state
actors actually inflicting the constitutional harm. 
125
One other circuit court has cited this language of control with
approval. 126 However, Arnold has been discussed or distinguished in other
cases in a fashion undermining control as the test for proximate cause. In
Tidwell v. Schweiker, a series of what were presumably mixed state and
federal rules determined that the disability benefits of incompetent patients
entering Illinois mental health facilities were paid to a "representative
payee." 127 Where family members were unavailable, the superintendent of the
patient's institution was appointed as the payee. The process afforded the
patient no notice and no opportunity to submit evidence. Plaintiff patients
sued the state and federal institutions on constitutional grounds. The District
Court found that the appointment of an institutional superintendent as a
representative payee was not per se unlawful, but that the procedures involved
in the appointment were inconsistent with due process standards. Attorney's
fees for the case were awarded against Illinois, but not the federal defendants.
The State appealed the fee award, relying on Arnold to urge that it was
federal-and not state-conduct that was the proximate cause of the injury.
Specifically, it urged that the illegal procedural aspect of the appointment
process was solely within the control of the federal defendants. The Seventh
Circuit upheld the lower court and dismissed the Arnold argument by holding
"it was not necessary for the state defendant to have had control over the
illegal procedures when the [Illinois agency] willingly participated in and
benefited from the procedures. 12 8 It was enough that, under the scheme, the
State was responsible for initiating the process that culminated in the
appointment of the superintendent as the payee. In doing this, the State agency
"set in motion a series of acts when the [agency] knew or should have known
that a constitutional injury was the only reasonable outcome." 129
In arriving at this conclusion, the court relied on the oft-cited Ninth
Circuit's decision in Johnson v. Duffy. 130 Here, in a case involving the relative
apportionment of fault between public actors in a § 1983 case, the court
concluded that "[t]he requisite causal connection can be established not only
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1356.
126. Jacob v. Curt, 898 F.2d 838, 839 (Ist Cir. 1990).
127. 677 F.2d 560, 569 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 61 U.S. 905 (1983).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 569 n.12. For the court, this minimal role in initiating what would amount to a
constitutional violation indicated the existence of a conspiracy between the federal and state
governments directed at the illegal diversion of Social Security benefits from the plaintiffs to the state
defendant.
130. 588 F.2d 740 (9th Cir. 1978).
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by some kind of direct personal participation in the deprivation, but also by
setting in motion a series of acts by others which the actor knows or
reasonably should know would cause others to inflict the constitutional
injury."13 2
More recently, in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe,1 .
the Ninth Circuit came to a similar conclusion, expressly invoking and
applying a test for proximate causation less stringent than control. There, the
court held that "[i]t is well-established that foreseeability analysis is an
appropriate part of proximate cause determinations in § 1983 actions.133
Foreseeability, as ultimately applied by the court, obliges a traditional tort law
inquiry into whether the harm was reasonably foreseeable.
These reasonable foreseeability cases grapple with proximate causation
as a means of apportioning blame between state actors. There is some
question as to whether they can be relied upon in cases where a court seeks to
determine the state action question, rather than to assess the relative
participation of undeniable state actors. Yet, as noted above, there are clear
statements in Van Oort and an implicit holding in Arnold suggesting that, at
least in the Ninth Circuit, it is appropriate to rely on proximate causation
doctrine developed in other contexts in deciding the state action question.
Consequently, it is urged that since other cases have regularly held that
proximate cause requires reasonable foreseeability, this is the standard that
courts should apply in state action proximate cause analyses.
b. State Action in International Law
In Eastman Kodak, the District Court observed that "[t]hough the
negative prohibitions of our own Constitution generally extend only to state
action, those who conspire with state actors to invade the constitutional rights
of others may be held liable along with the state actors .... Of course, just
because our constitutional distinctions are drawn one way does not mean that
we have to draw the same distinctions under the ATCA." 134 While reliance on
constitutional color of law/state action doctrine has clearly become the norm
in ATCA claims, there is a similar corpus of international law that is relevant.
Notably, some of these international precedents suggest a test for state action
that is broader than the nexus or joint action approaches extant in
constitutional practice.
In 1988, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights commented in the
Veldsquez Rodriguez case that "under international law a State is responsible
for the acts of its agents undertaken in their official capacity and for their
131. Id. at 743-44; see also Conner v. Reinhard, 847 F.2d 384, 396-97 (7th Cir. 1988) ("For
liability under section 1983, direct participation by a defendant is not necessary. Any official who
'causes' a citizen to be deprived of her constitutional rights can also be held liable. The requisite causal
connection is satisfied if the defendant set in motion a series of events that the defendant knew or should
reasonably have known would cause others to deprive the plaintiff of her constitutional rights."), cert.
denied 488 U.S. 856 (1988).
132. 216 F.3d 764 (9th Cir. 2000).
133. Id. at 784.
134. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Kavlin, 978 F. Supp. 1078, 1091 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
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omissions, even when those agents act outside the sphere of their authority or
violate internal law.' 135 More recently, in Prosecutor v. Tadic, the Appeals
Chamber of the ICTY considered the international principles for attributing
actions of private actors to state actors. 36 Critiquing the ICJ decision in
Nicaragua v. United States, 37 the Chamber concluded, "[t]he requirement of
international law for the attribution to States of acts performed by private
individuals is that the State exercises control over the individuals."1 38 Notably,
the degree of control required for state action varies with the factual
circumstances of each case. Citing a number of instances where attribution of
private action to the state requires substantial state involvement and direction
in the unlawful conduct of the private actor, the Chamber identified a
circumstance where the involvement of the state need not be as profound:
To these situations another one may be added, which arises when a State entrusts a private
individual (or group of individuals) with the specific task of performing lawful actions on its
behalf, but then the individuals, in discharging that task, breach an international obligation of the
State .... In this case, by analogy with the rules concerning State responsibility for acts of State
officials acting ultra vires, it can be held that the State incurs responsibility on account of its
specific request to the private individual or individuals to discharge a task on its behalf. 139
For the Chamber, the test for attribution of private acts to states in these
circumstances depends on whether or not the private party is an organized
military or paramilitary entity. Where "individuals making up an organised
and hierarchically structured group, such as a military unit or, in case of war
or civil strife, armed bands of irregulars or rebels" are implicated, and are
under the overall control of a state, "it must perforce engage the responsibility
of that State for its activities, whether or not each of them was specifically
imposed, requested or directed by the State." 140 In the court's words,
In order to attribute the acts of a military or paramilitary group to a State, it must be proved that
the State wields overall control over the group, not only by equipping and financing the group,
but also by coordinating or helping in the general planning of its military activity. Only then can
the State be held internationally accountable for any misconduct of the group. However, it is not
necessary that, in addition, the State should also issue, either to the head or to members of the
group, instructions for the commission of specific acts contrary to international law.'
4 1
On the other hand, where the private party is not a military or
paramilitary group, the level of control must be much more substantial and
include either specific instructions from the impugned state concerning the
commission of the wrongful act or ex post facto endorsement of a completed
violation.
135. Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 4 (1988), 170, reprinted in 9 HuM. RTs. L.J. 212 (1988),
available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/iachrb 11 12d.htm.
136. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Judgment of the Appeals Chamber, IT-94-1-A (July 15, 1999), at
http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/appeal/judgement/index_2.htm.
137. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27).
138. Tadic, IT-94-I-A, para. 117.
139. Id.,para. 119.
140. Id., paras. 120-23.
141. Id., para. 131.
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D. Conclusion
In sum, the ATCA creates an independent cause of action in tort for a
violation of the treaties of the United States and the law of nations. Courts
unearth the law of nations with reference to various authorities, endorsing as
international law those principles that are sufficiently universal and
obligatory. Court practice to date establishes that liability for individuals is
possible in two circumstances. First, ATCA liability may attach where
individual responsibility for breaches of international law is available at
international law. While the matter has yet to be decided in a U.S. court,
international war crimes tribunals have found individual liability for certain
acts of complicity with, at the very least, war crimes and crimes against
humanity. The three doctrines of complicitous guilt identified in the recent
Tadic decision of the ICTY vary in emphasis, but share in common an
intended participation in a criminal common enterprise. Taken together, they
suggest that, at international law, an accused is guilty not only for the intended
outcome of that shared criminal activity, but also for crimes that are the
natural and foreseeable consequences of the common enterprise and about
which the accused was reckless or indifferent.
Second, courts adjudicating ATCA matters have relied on color of law
jurisprudence to evaluate instances where private actors are so proximate to
state abuses as to be considered state actors liable for breaches of international
law. While state action law is not entirely consistent, in general, two sets of
circumstances have been employed by courts dealing with color of law
matters analogous to claims of corporate complicity with human rights abuses.
First, courts have sometimes found state action where a nexus exists between
the state and private parties. Courts teach that the nexus approach requires a
very high level of state/private actor interdependence. Unfortunately, no
bright line test exists establishing the exact quantum of interrelationship
necessary to make out state action. Though insufficient on its own, evidence
that both parties benefit from the wrongful act is the most important single
variable. Second, courts have discerned state action where the parties act
jointly. The joint action test examines whether state officials and private
parties have acted in concert in causing a particular deprivation of
constitutional rights. Joint action may be expressed via a conspiracy-defined
as a meeting of minds to deprive a person of constitutional rights--or through
the overt, significant assistance of one party in the rights-depriving conduct of
the other. There is also good authority for the proposition that the actions of
one transgressing party must be foreseeable to the party who, while causally
connected to the violation, does not actually commit the wrong. Foreseeability
in this context is probably best measured with reference to standard tort law
principles and not with reference to control over the wrongdoer's actions.
Notably, there is also a line of international state responsibility
jurisprudence analogous to domestic state action law. While this international
doctrine has not yet been applied in an ATCA claim, it represents a
supplemental-perhaps even more logical-approach to color of law. As with
much domestic color of law jurisprudence, the relevant state responsibility
concepts are directed at establishing when wrongful activities by private
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parties can be attributed to a state for liability purposes. As distilled in Tadic,
these international norms envisage the test for attribution of state
responsibility as varying according to the nature of the party committing the
wrongful actions. Where the wronging party is a military or paramilitary
organization, the state is responsible irrespective of whether it commanded or
endorsed the wrongful act so long as it has overall control over the group, by
equipping and financing the organization and by coordinating or helping in
the general planning of its military activity. Clearly, like much of the domestic
color of law jurisprudence discussed above, state responsibility at
international law is a doctrine linking states to wrongful actions by private
parties, rather than private parties to states. Yet liability issues raised in cases
like Unocal depend on companies being held accountable for wrongful actions
by the state. State responsibility, therefore, is a corpus of law whose
application depends on courts being prepared to adopt and invert the roles of
the relevant parties, perhaps in much the same way present ATCA
jurisprudence has relied on color of law doctrine to attribute state wrongs to
individuals. A court prepared to take these steps might find a company
responsible for the wrongful actions of a state military where it had control of
the right-violating unit-namely, where it equipped and financed the group
and aided in general operational planning. Depending on the facts in specific
cases, this standard may prove much simpler to apply and potentially more
demanding of companies than the often ambiguous domestic color of law tests
described above.
With these standards in mind, the following section evaluates the
decision in Unocal.
IV. DOE V. UNOCAL CORP.
In Unocal, the plaintiffs urged that Unocal was "liable for torts
committed against them by the Myanmar military for the benefit of the
[Yadana Pipeline] Project."142 As noted above, the latter is a pipeline initiative
undertaken by a consortium of which Unocal is a member. The project has
prompted serious human rights abuses by Burmese forces. Citing federal
causes of action under the ATCA, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO),14 3 and the federal question statute, 1" the plaintiffs
won a precedent-setting victory in 1997, persuading a District Court judge that
the matter should not be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction,14 5
and instead should proceed to trial. Subsequently, on August 31, 2000, the
court allowed the defendant's motion for summary judgment. The following
discussion focuses on the ATCA claim.
142. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1303 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
143. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (2001)
144. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994).
145. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 890 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
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A. Holding on Summary Judgment
After distilling the facts, the court noted that "it]o state a claim under the
ATCA, a plaintiff must allege (1) a claim by an alien, (2) alleging a tort, and
(3) a violation of the law of nations (international law).' 146 The first two
assertions were not at issue, prompting the court to focus on the international
law question. Concluding that "[a]ctionable violations of international law
must be of a norm that is specific, universal, and obligatory,"1 47 the court
considered the vexing question of whether individuals could be liable for
breaches of international law. Citing with approval the view that "certain
forms of conduct violate the law of nations whether undertaken by those
acting under the auspices of a state or only as private individuals," 148 the court
observed that "[w]hile crimes such as torture and summary execution are
proscribed by international law only when committed by state officials or
under color of law . . . the law of nations has historically been applied to
private actors for the crimes of piracy and slave trading, and for certain war
crimes."
149
Apparently agreeing that "forced labor" committed by the Burmese
regime amounted to slavery and thus was one of the acts for which
international law assigned individual liability, the court considered whether
Unocal was responsible for the regime's conduct. Confronted with the
plaintiffs' claims that principles of vicarious liability existed in international
law governing forced labor, the court considered the prosecution of Nazi
industrialists for use of forced labor in the Second World War. For the court,
these cases teach that "liability requires participation or cooperation in the
forced labor practices."' 150 Turning to Unocal's role, the court held that
there are no facts suggesting that Unocal sought to employ forced or slave labor. In fact,
the Joint Venturers expressed concern that the Myanmar government was utilizing forced
labor in connection with the Project. In turn, the military made efforts to conceal its use
of forced labor. The evidence does suggest that Unocal knew that forced labor was being
utilized and that the Joint Venturers benefitted from the practice. However, because such
a showing is insufficient to establish liability under international law, Plaintiffs' claim
against Unocal for forced labor under the Alien Tort Claims Act fails as a matter of
law.'
5
Turning to the question of whether Unocal was operating "under color of
law," the court relied on civil rights jurisprudence under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
holding that "an individual acts under 'color of law' within the meaning of
section 1983 when he acts together with state officials or with significant state
aid." Citing Collins v. Womancare152 and Gallagher v. "Neil Young Freedom
Concert, ,153 the court considered the color of law issue by asking whether
Unocal was a joint participant in the challenged activity-one who
146. Unocal, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 1303.
147. Id. at 1304.
148. Id. at 1305 (citing Kadie v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232,239 (2d Cir. 1995)).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1310.
151. Id.
152. Collins v. Womancare, 878 F.2d 1145 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1056 (1990).
153. Gallagher v. "Neil Young Freedom Concert," 49 F.3d 1442 (10th Cir. 1995).
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participated in or influenced the challenged action or who conspired or shared
a common objective to commit violations. According to the court, the
plaintiffs marshaled evidence
demonstrating that before joining the Project, Unocal knew that the military had a record
of committing human rights abuses; that the Project hired the military to provide security
for the Project, a military that forced villagers to work and entire villages to relocate for
the benefit of the Project; that the military, while forcing villagers to work and relocate,
committed numerous acts of violence; and that Unocal knew or should have known that
the military did commit, was committing, and would continue to commit these tortious
acts.
154
Yet, while Unocal and the Burmese regime "shared the goal of a
profitable project," the plaintiffs presented "no evidence that Unocal
'participated in or influenced' the military's unlawful conduct... 'conspired'
with the military to commit the challenged conduct... [or] 'controlled' the
Myanmar military's decision to commit the alleged tortious acts."
155
Therefore, Unocal's actions were not the proximate cause of the violations
within the meaning established by Arnold, and the plaintiffs' "claims that




An analysis of the decision with reference to applicable legal principles
set out earlier in this Note casts doubt on the correctness of the court's
decision. Its application of the joint action test for state action is generally
consistent with the authorities discussed in Section III.C. No facts are cited by
the court suggesting that the company conspired to deprive the plaintiffs of
their rights. Nor is there evidence that the company assisted in the actual
infliction of human rights abuses. Nevertheless, materials on the record
suggested that the company's contract made the military "responsible forCO•TP.57
protecting the pipeline. In fact, the Unocal officials acknowledged that the
companies "hired the Burmese military to provide security for the Project and
pay for these through the [government-run] Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise.
... [T]hree truckloads of soldiers accompany Project officials as they conduct
survey work and visit villages."15  Company officials also recognized that
their "assertion that SLORC ha[d] not expanded and amplified its usual
methods around the pipeline on our behalf m[ight] not withstand much
scrutiny." 159 These facts point to a project formally tying the military to the
company and obliging an increased military presence. The enhanced military
presence, in turn, exacerbated human rights abuses. Further, the companies
provided at least some material assistance to the military security providers,
154. Unocal, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 1306.
155. Id. at 1306-07.
156. Id. at 1307.
157. Id. at 1301.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 1300.
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both in terms of paying for the military presence and in terms of providing
transportation.
Taken together, these facts suggest two objections to the court's ultimate
conclusion on joint action. First, the court is likely wrong in dismissing the
plaintiffs claim on proximate cause grounds. Its reliance of the Arnold
language of control as the test for proximate cause ignores more persuasive
and recent authority calling for a tort-like test of reasonable foreseeability.
Given Unocal's familiarity with the rights-violating record and activity of the
regime, the consequences for the plaintiffs seem eminently foreseeable.
Second, the court concludes correctly that one line of joint action
jurisprudence requires participation in the impugned conduct. Clearly, the
construction of a pipeline is not per se an unlawful action. Yet, given the facts
cited above, it is arguable that participation by the company in the provision
of military security was intimately linked to the army's human rights abuses.
The facts alleged suggest that, absent the pipeline project, the abuses would
have never occurred. More than providing a motivation for the abuses, the
pipeline project provided material and financial support to the security forces.
That this support was remote in time and not directed per se at the actual
abuse does not necessarily mean that it was not part of a joint action of
"providing security for the pipeline" that had, as its foreseeable consequences,
serious human rights abuses.
The Unocal court appears to reduce the requisite unlawful conduct to the
moments of the actual human rights abuses. It implicitly confines the actors
caught up in the joint action to the parties who are present at the time of the
abuse and who physically inflict the harm. Such a narrow view of unlawful
conduct seems deeply inconsistent with the very objectives of the proximate
cause test upon which the court ultimately relies. After all, if wrongful joint
action only arose where the impugned behavior was contemporaneous with,
and directed specifically at, the abuse, the question of foreseeability would be
significantly less important. In fact, as the cases cited in Section III.C suggest,
joint action may arise where the participation of one party is remote in time
and content from the other party's ultimately wrongful acts. In Tidwell and
Johnson, the Seventh and Ninth Circuits found participation in unlawful
conduct where one party initiated a process of which the foreseeable
consequences were constitutional violations by another party. 160 Put another
way, a sensible reconciliation of the twin requirements of unlawful conduct
and proximate causation would envisage unlawful conduct as activities that
contribute in fact to abuses that are reasonably foreseeable. On the authority
of Tidwell and Johnson, joint action should exist if Unocal set in motion a
series of acts where it knew or should have known that a human rights
violation was the only reasonable outcome. 61 Measured against this standard,
the facts alleged by the plaintiffs in Unocal should have been sufficient to
survive summary judgment.
Third, the court's discussion of color of law fails to consider the nexus
approach. While the precise requirements for this prong of the state action
160. Supra notes 127, 130 and accompanying text.
161. Id.
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test-and even its continued vitality-are deeply uncertain, Unocal's financial
and material involvement in the provision of security by the Burmese military
in Unocal raises real questions about interdependence. Further, there is a clear
prospect that both parties benefitted from the abuses committed by the
military. On the one hand, the brutalization of the population assures the
company of project security and non-resistance to its activities. On the other
hand, the regime is able to attract and retain a substantial and essential foreign
presence in a key project.
Fourth, the international state responsibility material set out in Tadic
presents an alternative or complementary approach to state action that has
potential implications for the outcome in Unocal. An application of the Tadic
state responsibility approach test, applied to the Burmese military, might
render Unocal culpable where the company had overall control over the
relevant units. According to Tadic, the question of control considers the role
of the firm in equipping and financing the military and in coordinating or
helping in the general planning of its military activity. As noted above, the
company played some role in financing and equipping units. The facts recited
by the court do not describe Unocal as having a planning role. However, its
joint venture partner Total reportedly met regularly with the military "to
inform them of the next day's activities so that soldiers [could] ensure the area
[was] secure" and guard the work area while the survey team conducted its
business.162 If there is evidence of similar briefings by Unocal, the elements of
control may well be present.
Finally, the court does not draw on international law principles
establishing personal liability for complicity with certain crimes against
humanity and war crimes. Certainly, several of the allegations made by the
plaintiffs concerned crimes against humanity committed by the Burmese
military in relation to the pipeline project. If the facts showed that these
violations were the natural and foreseeable consequences of a common
enterprise and that the company was reckless or indifferent as to these
consequences, the international law standard for complicitous guilt set out in
Tadic might be met. Critically, however, the enterprise in which the company
intends to participate must itself be criminal. While Tadic provides no
definition of what constitutes a criminal enterprise, the language in that case
suggests that a criminal enterprise at international law is one directed at
committing an international crime, such as a crime against humanity or a war
crime. As the common enterprise in Unocal is the provision of security for a
pipeline-an endeavor associated with, but not per se, an international
crime-this element of complicitous guilt is not made out. Here, it is unlikely
that the foreseeability inquiry analogous to that employed in the § 1983 joint
action approach applies. Even if the company supplied material and financial
support to Burmese troops, the mens rea requirement of "intent to participate
in a criminal enterprise" would likely require a showing that this assistance
was provided with the intent of furthering criminal actions by the soldiers, not
simply that these criminal acts were foreseeable.
162. Unocal, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 1301.
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V. CONCLUSION
Of the several cases alleging corporate complicity in human rights
abuses, 163 Doe v. Unocal has proceeded furthest. The dismissal of the case on
summary judgment has clear implications for other cases. While the decision
on its face seems damning to plaintiffs intent on using the ATCA to hold
companies accountable for alleged complicity with human rights abuses, a
review of relevant principles of U.S. and international law suggest that much
remains to be explored in the ATCA context. Specifically, the standards for
complicitous guilt in international law, international state responsibility rules,
and the U.S. color of law doctrine all suggest a number of different avenues
for capturing complicity as an actionable wrong. There is some basis for
concluding that the Unocal court's holding does not fully exhaust these areas
of law, raising questions concerning its sustainability on appeal and its
precedential impact on other, similar corporate complicity cases. In sum,
while complicity arguments predicated on the ATCA's uncertain substantive
law are a clear Achilles heel in ATCA lawsuits, the Act may yet prove a
means for plaintiffs to seek compensation from companies practicing an
unabashed form of militarized commerce in joint ventures with human rights
abusing regimes.
163. See discussion in Part I.
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